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Collecting to the Core — U.S. Presidential Campaigns
by Jeremy Darrington (Politics Librarian, Princeton University Library; Political Science Editor, Resources for College
Libraries) <jdarring@princeton.edu>
Column Editor: Anne Doherty (Resources for College Libraries Project Editor, CHOICE/ACRL) <adoherty@ala-choice.org>
Column Editor’s Note: The “Collecting
to the Core” column highlights monographic
works that are essential to the academic library within a particular discipline, inspired
by the Resources for College Libraries bibliography (online at http://www.rclweb.net).
In each essay, subject specialists introduce
and explain the classic titles and topics that
continue to remain relevant to the undergraduate curriculum and library collection. Disciplinary trends may shift, but some classics
never go out of style. — AD

I

n the early 1940s, Paul Lazarsfeld and
several colleagues at Columbia University
embarked on a series of landmark studies to
investigate how people decide whom to vote
for in U.S. presidential elections. In contrast
to the popular focus emphasizing political
strategy and pivotal events, decisions, or gaffes
along the campaign trail, Lazarsfeld concluded in The People’s Choice that while people
hesitate and meditate and imagine that they
decide rationally on the better road to take, it
would have often been possible to predict at the
outset what they would decide to do in the end.
Knowing a few of their personal characteristics, we can tell with fair certainty how they
will finally vote: they join the fold to which
they belong…a person thinks, politically, as
he is, socially. Social characteristics determine
political preference.1
In the decades following, numerous other
research studies confirmed Lazarsfeld’s
conclusion that voters’ sociodemographic predispositions, especially partisan identification,
strongly condition their vote choice.
However, Lazarsfeld’s view that voters
merely “imagine that they decide rationally”
was too strong. As V. O. Key countered in The
Responsible Electorate, “voters are not fools…
the electorate behaves about as rationally and
responsibly as we should expect, given the
clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the
character of the information available to it.”2
This insight — that voters are rational but operate in an environment of limited information
— led Key to an important intuition: voters
treat elections as referenda on the incumbent
party’s policies and performance. “As voters
mark their ballots they may have in their minds
impressions of the last TV political spectacular
of the campaign, but, more important, they
have in their minds recollections of their experiences of the past four years.”3 Later work
made it clear that voters give particular weight
to the performance of the national economy in
these retrospective evaluations.4
But why should voters care about what
happened in the past rather than evaluating
candidates on the merits of their proposed policies and plans? The answer, Samuel Popkin
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argued in The Reasoning Voter, is that voters
engage in “low-information rationality” when
voting. Because voters have little detailed
knowledge about politics and policies “and a
limited understanding of how governmental
actions are connected to consequences of
immediate concern to them,” they rely on information shortcuts to help them make voting
decisions.5 Since voters have difficulty anticipating the effects of proposed policies or how
leaders will actually govern once elected, they
use shortcuts like party identification and evaluations of the incumbent party’s management
of the economy to provide relevant information
to fill in the gaps.
The reliance of voters on these cues to
guide vote choices led to a recognition among
political scientists that presidential elections
could be predicted on the basis of these “fundamentals,” as they came to be known. Indeed,
by the early 1990s, scholars had developed
forecasting models that, relying on a handful
of indicators like partisan identification, recent
GDP growth, and presidential approval, were
able to predict the outcomes of presidential
elections within a percentage point or
two.6-7 The natural conclusion
these strands of research
pointed to was the “minimal effects” thesis of U.S.
presidential campaigns: if
elections are so predictable, then campaigns must
not matter all that much.
But that conclusion didn’t
sit well with many researchers.
After all, if campaigns don’t really matter, how do we explain the inordinate
amount of time, attention, effort, and money
poured into them (more than $2.3 billion on the
2012 presidential race alone)?8 One answer is
that campaigns are not ineffective, just equally
effective. In our high-stakes, two-party system,
the effects of two well-matched, well-funded
campaigns largely cancel each other out. Like a
game of tug-of-war, if one side lets go, the other
side easily wins. “But of course the candidates
do not let go and that makes it hard to see that
their efforts are making a difference.”9
Another answer, it turns out, is to reframe
the question. Instead of asking, “Do campaigns
matter?” researchers decided to ask, “When
and in what ways do campaigns matter?” This
question has generated a large body of research,
establishing that campaigns do indeed matter.
Several key ideas have emerged from this
recent work.
First, scholars agree that the “fundamentals,” those “national conditions that set the
stage for the campaign” — such as the state of
the economy, the balance of partisan leanings,
and presidential approval — are major, but not
absolute, determinants of voter choice.10 Draw-

ing on a rolling survey of over 57,000 voters
(most nationally representative surveys have
fewer than 3,000 respondents), Kate Kenski
and her colleagues were able to test a host of
different potential influences on voters’ choices
for president in 2008. In The Obama Victory:
How Media, Money, and Message Shaped
the 2008 Election, their analysis shows that
fundamentals account for about 80 percent of
the variance in voter’s choice of candidate.11
That’s quite significant, but it leaves room for
influence, and in close elections a little bit of
influence can make all the difference. And
anyway, to state the obvious, candidates still
have to compete to win. Even though “the
outcome can typically be foreseen from the
fundamentals of the campaign…surprises are
possible….Just as in baseball, the season must
be played out to determine who wins.”12
Second, recent work has made clear
that campaigns fulfill an important role in
enabling voter learning. Since most voters
have limited political knowledge and interest, campaign events and messaging serve
to drum up interest in politics and
enlighten voters about the
character, competence,
and policy positions of
candidates. As Popkin
notes, “campaign” is a
military term and an apt
metaphor, because candidates “must engage their
political opponents in a
series of battles conducted in full view of their
countrymen, who will
judge each contest. To arouse public opinion
and generate support for their cause, they must
defend old policies, sell new policies, and justify their rule.”13 And like other spectator sports,
these public battles activate latent loyalties and
mobilize support, effectively sorting voters into
competing teams rooting for their champion.
This metaphor is also useful for highlighting two related points that run against commonly held beliefs about campaigns. First, many
people deplore the mudslinging and negative
attacks so ubiquitous to campaigning. However, as John Geer argues in his In Defense
of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns, negativity in campaigns is a vital part
of the democratic process.14 Candidates have
an incentive to expose shortcomings in their
opponents’ character, competence, and policies
and to respond to attacks against them in turn.
This competitive dynamic increases the availability and quality of information available to
voters (for example, most candidates rarely
release tax returns without being challenged
to do so). To extend the battle metaphor, you
can’t win a boxing match without throwing a
continued on page 61
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punch. Furthermore, how you fight can be just
as informative — if you throw a lot of punches
below the belt, you may get away with it, but
you risk turning the crowd against you.
Another common belief is to proclaim this
or that event (say, Romney’s 47 percent comment or Obama’s performance in the first presidential debate in 2012) to be a “game-changer.” In The Timeline of Presidential Elections:
How Campaigns Do (and Do Not) Matter,
Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien
analyze all the national presidential election
polls from 1952 to 2008 (more than 2000 of
them) to determine how voter preferences
evolve over the timeline of the presidential
campaign. They find that vote choice slowly
coalesces throughout the election year. While
political ads and other campaign events may
affect voters’ candidate preferences, most of
the effects disappear quickly without leaving
a trace, like ripples from a pebble tossed into
a river. There are two exceptions, though.
The first involves the national nominating
conventions, which are major spectacles that
engage and inform large numbers of voters,
help activate and cement latent party loyalties,
and mobilize supporters. The other exception
is short-term movements of opinion in the final
two weeks of the campaign that affect the vote
before their effect wears off. But the scope
for such last-minute movements is limited,
“as remarkably few voters change their minds
over the course of the campaign.”15 Again the
battle metaphor is instructive — most events of
the campaign are glancing blows, not knockout
punches, but sometimes landing a few glancing
blows at the end of a match can be enough to
have it called in your favor.
The third major lesson from the recent campaign literature is that the messages campaigns
choose to focus on make a difference. In The
Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns, Lynn Vavreck applies
the lessons of “low-information rationality” to
campaign strategy.16 In choosing a candidate to
match their preferred positions on issues, voters
face uncertainty about the relative importance
of different policies, about where a candidate
stands on an issue, and about how certain
they are that the candidate actually holds the
position he or she professes. Candidates thus
engage in three distinct behaviors that inform
voters. By talking repeatedly about certain
issues (a process called priming), candidates
attempt to focus the agenda of elections onto
issues favorable to them. They also attempt
to persuade voters that they hold specific
positions — or that their opponents do — and
to clarify their positions on important issues,
primarily the economy (which is the best issue
because it’s always clear which side to be on
— “everyone prefers prosperity to decline”).17
Ultimately, this leads to two dominant strategies for candidates, depending on whether
the fundamentals favor them or not—either
they run a clarifying campaign to emphasize
“their role in fostering the good economic
times or their lack of a role in bringing about
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bad times” or they run an insurgent campaign,
which attempts to refocus the election off the
economy and onto a popular issue that “directly
exploit[s] the weaknesses or constraints of
their opponents.” In other words, if you can’t
use “it’s the economy stupid,” then you’d
better change the subject. Testing her theory
against the fifteen presidential elections from
1952 to 2008, Vavreck concludes that the
“impressive relationship between citizens and
national economic context can be intensified if
candidates choose to talk about the economy
in their campaigns,” but “candidates’ rhetoric
about other issues can drive out the importance
of the economy if they choose the right issue.
The structural conditions matter, but they can
be overcome.”18
Many questions remain about precisely in
what ways and for whom campaigns matter.
For example, while there’s general agreement
that a small segment of the population in any
given election can be swayed from one side
to the other (perhaps as much as 20 percent,
but likely less than 10 percent), there’s much
disagreement about which voters are most
persuadable. Most of the literature has argued,
following Lazarsfeld, that voters with the least
political knowledge and interest are the most
persuadable, since they can benefit the most
from the informational effects of campaigns.
However, others have argued that campaigns
frequently use “wedge” issues to try to target
and win over knowledgeable partisans who
have strong preferences on an issue that diverges from their party’s candidate (for example,
in 2004 Democrats tried to use the issue of
stem cell research to attract the votes of Republicans who disagreed with Bush’s stance
against it).19 Another question of increasing
relevance to campaign researchers concerns
the issue of “microtargeting” — the ability of
campaigns to leverage technology and vast
databases of information on voters to send
messages and appeals finely tuned to various
constituencies, say 45 to 55-year-old white,
female, college-educated Democrats making
more than $120,000 a year in Princeton, New
Jersey. There is much we don’t know about
how these groups are selected, what kinds of
messages are targeted to them, and how effective the appeals are.
But with all that we know (or don’t know)
about campaigns, perhaps one lesson is most
worth remembering in this election season:
“the people’s verdict can be no more than a
selective reflection from among the alternatives
and outlooks presented to them….If the people
can choose only from among rascals, they are
certain to choose a rascal.”20
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digital skills as well as provide comfortable
reading and working spaces. A couple
of points that specifically interested me.
Americans are divided on a fundamental
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question about how books should be treated
at libraries: 24% support the idea of moving
books and stacks in order to make way for
more community- and tech-oriented spaces,
while 31% say libraries should not move the
books to create such spaces. About four-in-ten
think libraries should maybe consider doing so.
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